

Recent Issues in Ongoing Political Struggle in India: An Overview

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Abstract: India, the world's largest democracy, has a very recent history of democracy. India's political landscape has changed numerous times. India has experienced many things, including one-party rule, multi-party coalitions during the emergency, a constitutional crisis, and much more. There have been numerous political parties and socio-political movements that have come and gone. This study aims to provide a broad picture of India's political history from the time of its independence to the present. It covers the Congress system following independence, Indira Gandhi's emergency period, the BJP's rise to power in 2014 and 2019, and more. Current political events have sparked discussions over the preamble's phrasing and the rights granted by India's constitution. Examples of these issues include the Citizenship Amendment Act, protests against farm policies, and other topics. We have examined the current problems with the ongoing political conflicts in Nepal and India in this research note.

Keywords: Politics, political issues, struggle, policies, and etc.

Introduction

The idea that constitutes modernity is democratic systems, but it has been applied in various situations and shaped over time to suit the interests and conveniences of elected officials all over the world. The story is similar in India. Indian democracy has been declining since the nation gained autonomy in 1947, while immorality has been increasing.

A constitutional republic is a system of governance where citizens are run by those who represent them they elect. In other words, it is a governing body by, for, and by its citizens. The residents are independent and omnipotent in this kind of leadership. The administration is under their authority. They are allowed to choose the kind of authority that they want. The foundation of civilization is the right to choose.

India is home to the strongest governments in the cosmos as a whole. On 26 January 1950, the Indian Constitution came into force. It inaugurated the era of democratization. India evolved into an independent nation with a strong sense of fairness, justice, liberty, and brotherhood. The Indian worldview is reflected in the Beginning, the Guidelines of Government Policy, and the Bill of Rights, which guarantee everyone the right to vote regardless of background, faith, caste, real estate, or sexual orientation. The dominant party or cooperation forms an administration following a referendum, and the person in charge of that party becoming the nation's leader.

The means of transport of ideas are partisan groups. In democracies, parties serve as a conduit for social discourse and political decision-making. There are several parties in the Indian political system. Nevertheless pragmatism and dishonesty have progressively taken over democracy as a game. The majority of electoral organizations are solely concerned with gaining power. Diverse caste politics are adopted by each party. Some attempt to sway public opinion

through class politics. Some attempt to inflame public religious feelings. Faith and caste have supplanted Indian philosophy in modern times.

Ignatieff says that republican providentialism characterizes George W. Bush's vision for the globe. Democracies are "God's gift to mankind," according to republican providentialism. According to Ignatieff, this concept helped the President win reelection, served as the primary defense for the Iraq War, and is a favorite among his core, orthodox supporters. Ignatieff points out that although the administration of George Bush may have lofty goals for the spread of democratization throughout the Muslim world, these goals can only be achieved by the people living in Islamic states. In a sense, "parliamentary providentialism feeds the illusion that the United States is the driving force of world events." "The United States of has authority and ought to employ it, but history does not always serve Americans grand creates," writes Ignatieff was. Ignatieff comes to the conclusion that for Bush's republican providentialism to succeed, Iraq must succeed and the providentialism Bush talks about must appeal to a larger, more diversified readership than just Bush's political supporters.

Rather than being misplaced romanticism, as some detractors would have it, the author contends in this piece that the encouragement of democratization "reflects a practical, changing, and sophisticated comprehension of how to construct an equitable and reasonably peaceful international order." The author provides five arguments for his belief in this. First, democracy tends to be less warlike; The author refers to this as "the amity of democrats." Second, the author makes the case that elected officials and economic success are related. Therefore, it is in the United States' financial best interest to advance democracies elsewhere. Third, democratization encourages interrelationships which has positive effects on the economy and stabilizes politics.

Kaplan contends that "democratic rule develops efficiently only as an endpoint to other socioeconomic accomplishments." The author uses numerous examples of countries where dictatorial government has succeeded and countries where democracy is failing to advantage its people ("one of the most aggressive places on earth [that isn't] a war zone") and countries like Peru under Fujimori's rule, where "it is hard to demonstrate that Peru didn't gain anything from his rule"). Kaplan makes the argument that "while we espouse our version of capitalism elsewhere, it slips away from us at home" in the article's last section (72). ("Democratically management, at the national, provincial, and local level goes on. But it's capacity impact our lives are limited.") He highlights the growing power of businesses and the waning significance of democracies. Kaplan bemoans the emphasis placed on physical possessions in the industrialized world, especially in the US, and contends that this inward concentration on accumulating goods undermines the sense of belonging or connectedness that is necessary for democratic institutions to work. The writer ends by cautioning that if the West fails to see the difficulties and dangers facing our "enthronement governmental achievements" of a free society, we will probably suffer the same fate as previous cultures who believed themself to be the pinnacle of humanity or the end of mankind.

Sen, Amartya (see [8]) "Democracy as a Universal Value," *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 10, no. 3, July 1999: 3-17.

Sen covers a number of topics that are essential to understanding the expansion and advancement of democratization around the world, especially in so-called nations that are not part One of the most common questions regarding the "export" of democratization is whether democratization is being promoted in non-Western nations in the same way as so-called occidental ideals, or to what degree this is a sort of British cultural capitalism. Sen Answers these problems by bringing out the history of democratic systems throughout a wide range of nations and societies, and arguing that to conceive of democratization as the realm of the West is erroneous at best. Additionally, he challenges the idea that "Western" civilization is "more" or "directly" developed from the Greek culture of democracy than are purportedly indigenous cultures. Sen contends that the spread of a limited definition of democratization that is thought of "purely in terms of public casting votes" is one of the reasons why democratization has been mistakenly perceived as being

more "Western". Sen contends that the concept of democracy is better understood in far larger terms, even though voting has grown to be an essential component of an effective democracy. This is referred to by Rawls as "the application of public reason" and by Buchanan as "the government by discourse." Sen argues that it becomes evident that free speech is an international standard rather than a "Western" conception when we comprehend it in these richer, more general terms and when we are adequately aware of its many and multifarious beginnings.

When a contention is presented in its most flimsy form, it remains easy to criticize and ignore it. It doesn't take much courage these days to criticize the security-focused programs of the Indian state apparatus, especially those of the Home Secretary. Rather, we should consider the government's kind, almost humanitarian, statement made in the month of September 2009 during his speech to state police chiefs: "Remember that the Communist Party of China has the backing of the nation's weakest of the poor." This PM comment is frequently used by left-wing opponents of the upcoming armed state operation to support their claims that the people they represent are genuinely impoverished, innocent bystanders, and common villagers who are going to suffer if the military operation is carried out.

However, observing the oppressive aspect of the Indian government preparing for the attack, it is nearly unfathomable that it is gathering all its might to confront such destitute, struggling individuals as the Adivasis of Central India! The poorest of the poor are considered hazardous solely because the state is inherently oppressive, or is it that these individuals 'really' pose a threat? Why is it that the same state—which is occasionally benevolent and has a democratic constitution—wants to step in and solve the "problem" in one instance while also supporting the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA), which grants—albeit reluctantly—different rights? If those at the bottom of those in need are only perceived as "enduring" and in need of "rights," then there must be somewhere about them, someone amazing, that is imperceptible to a flat, humanitarian, do-good worldview! What is the power that they possess that the powerful Indian state fears and wishes to eradicate as quickly as possible? It's important to realize the power that comes with being the least fortunate of the poor, even if one is not a Communist or supports Maoism.

The state is not afraid of their brutality, weaponry, or ability to tax the local populace. Nor is it afraid that they will establish yet another alternative system of power. The state and Indian democracy are afraid of these people because they are the most impoverished of the poor, have nothing to lose (and therefore cannot be bought off or absorbed), and can therefore start and drive a relentless political uprising that goes beyond their instantaneous dissatisfaction such as losing their land or means of subsistence. In fact, there isn't even a list of requirements made by the Communist Party or any other Adivasi group involved in violent conflict that the authorities could conceivably meet or take into consideration. There appears to be an atmosphere developing where they want "a world to win" and are not ready to compromise for anything less than "peace with justice," much like those who have everything to lose but their chains. Without a doubt, if you are fighting a war with no making any requirements, you are fighting for the world, led by people who have no place in it.

Consequently, the Indian government has no fear of this particular Dantewada; in fact, it has been letting the "Maoist virus" fester in Dantewada for a number of years and is just now preparing a major offensive. It does and can withstand it. In reality, many people consider the the Maoist group to be an additional structure of authority that operates independently or at the behest of various power groups, engaging in kidnapping and other such activities. This implies that the Maoists, as an armed force, may be accepted and integrated.

On the other hand, the Indian state should be afraid that there could be more than one Dantewada, not just one contained one as a local event, if the lowest of the poor, like the Maoists, want the globe to triumph. Are Tebhaga, Telangana, Srikakulam, Naxalbari, Jharkhand, Dantewada, and Lalgarh not among the several Dantewada's that have been scattered throughout recent Indian history? What if they appeared at the same time and in various locations around the

nation? Ultimately, these individuals possess "global goals," as evidenced by their presence in Nepal, who aim to topple the Indian government while humbling the International. They are not limited to discussing tribal affiliation or rights; they also back citizenship is struggling in Kashmir and the Northeast, indicating a much broader schedule, if not a more explicit goal. This 'virus' has the potential to damage the Indian state not just strategically, as it already has, but also strategically. The most impoverished of the poor started appearing as an electoral problem in 1967, thanks to Naxalbari. This legacy is still there today in numerous forms throughout the nation, but the fight towards the established order has reached a boiling point as part of the Maoist revolution.

Governmental or military concern without fault?

Though they seem to be unaware of the ideological consciousness of the lowest of the poor, large segments of the left do seem to comprehend the oppressive nature of capital and the state. Nevertheless, a moral, almost subjectivity criticism of the state's oppressive "nature" is a little too involved in portraying the impoverished as sufferers or defenseless bystanders, who are then kept that way the entire time. Consequently, the potency and credibility of most criticisms of the state's imminent armed onslaught comes from their ability to portray the poor as victims or, at most, as someone merely defending his ancestral land against greedy corporations supported by the government. It is not accepted that the lowest of the poor could have cheated oneself out of being unintentional victims, or the recipients of any kind of social welfare system.

The ruling classes are afraid of the very union of the electoral and the impoverished, which must be envisioned and affirmed in opposition to the compassion of certain leftist factions. According to academic Peter Linebaugh, Tommy Spence was a radical proletariat in eighteenth-century England, and his radicalism "was not because he was a proletariat or that he had ideas in contrast to private ownership but that he was both." This is the recipe, if you will: under today's rights-based business capitalism, being poor and needy is an ideal combination that is permitted. You can be rich and radical, but not poor and revolutionary.

Is this, the unwillingness or incapacity to see the weakest of the poor as political subjects, just another example of how we can all laugh heartily at Fukuyama's theory that history is coming to an end, but it's so damn hard to make history these days? We are strongly reminded that attempting to create (universal?) history will entail the use of force, violence, a party, and could even result in the establishment of a totalitarian state. Thus, we are informed, the poorest of the poor are not inherently problematic; rather, it is their expression of themselves as political entities, such as the Maoist movement or Naxals, that poses a threat to democracy. However, the political battle of the weakest of the poor opposing the ruling class has become more intense and has reached unprecedented dimensions in the context of the Chinese Communist Party today.

The most impoverished of the poor are rising up and casting their votes on the nation's very political structure and the rule of law, and the armed obnoxious is not just the voice of the wealthy but more essentially demonstrates the true nature of what passes for democratic government in India. Let's argue that this is a response to the 'repression' of the electoral subjectivity of the poorest of the poor, and that they are engaged in a battle to save their livelihoods and assets rather than that the armed objectionable is just going to kill them and clear their way. It is evident how dishonest it is now to target just Manmohan and the IB, Home Ministry, and Jungle Warfare vultures as hawks. Though there appears to be a wider but quiet an agreement, it may only be Karnataka DGP Vishwa Ranjan who publicly calls for ending the Maoists in the manner of the LTTE. There has been no advocacy by any of the major political parties in favor of the poorest of the poor. Similar to the 2002 pogrom in Gujarat or the multiple airstrikes and fatalities in the Northeast, the current armed insurgency may succeed, and Indian democracy will continue to function as usual in a sterile, routine manner. The Indian democracy is once again exposed, as it has been for many years, and the question now is whether we will continue the political battle that is currently raging against it (see [1-2]).

More indicative is the fact that right-wing Hindu parties have failed to turn it into an electoral vehicle for populism parliamentary stunts, with the exception of a few media-savvy, aggressive pronouncements to crush the Maoists opposing the Indian state. For instance, the BJP would openly urge the authorities to send the army to quell the Kashmiri uprising once it becomes active in an attempt to garner support. Even the right wing is reluctant to openly declare or incite war on the Dantewada issue because the Maoist or Naxal problem, with its base among the least fortunate of the impoverished, is a delicate one that undermines Indian democracy. Hence, the best response is to portray the organization of Maoists and militant Indigenous peoples as just criticizing the state of India and not truly threatening the concept of India itself, moving far beyond the old preoccupation of the separation of church and the pet Hindu-Muslim dispute, and other issues.

Many have noted that the Indians have inadvertently became Maoists as a result of the state's incorrect practices. Nevertheless, what is more telling is the implied belief that those at the bottom of the poor can only (by default?) be concerned with matters pertaining to their means of subsistence, and that they are unable to venture outside them and engage in political discourse. After a while, the idea of "innocent trapped civilians" begins to feed into an argument in which the urban middle class left, who is the only group capable of engaging in democracy by going above and beyond for its constituents, becomes their only source of backing. As if they are only meant to be used this far and no more! The default presumption is apparently that the lowest of the poor can be totally deserving of privileges and entry to materials but cannot be politically(see[3-4])!

Not only do the lowest of the poor hold sway over numerous assets and mine riches that they are unwilling to part with, but they also have political ties and, dare I say it, Maoist leanings. It is crucial, according to those on the left who are demanding "peace with justice," to distinguish among Indigenous peoples or common citizens and Maoists. This is a legitimate and significant distinction. It appears, though, that this divide frequently results from a failure to acknowledge that the most impoverished people in the world now hold the potential for a revolution in politics. In what respects are the current political disputes in Dantewada and Lalgarh critical to the future of political and social change? Is it merely "armed conflict," "violence," "livelihood issues," "resource snatching by MNCs," "Maoist intolerance," or something else entirely? Or is there a far bigger political fight going on there that has the potential to spark a nationwide mobilization of revolutionary's forces? On the other hand, do the Maoists envision the potential for profound change, or do they simply see more places to conquer and more authority over?

The various struggles and rebellions that are occurring throughout the nation must therefore unite around this central fault line that weakens the ruling classes and challenges them to reveal some of their last lines of preservation of oneself, if the Lalgarhs and Dantewadas are, in fact, arenas developing the political fight in the country and not just impending catastrophes for humanity due to "armed conflict." In order to elevate the movement, calling on the administration to end the armed operation must be a part of a broader, domestic political brotherhood campaign.

Concerning Aggression and Democratic Conflict

This begs the important question of why other left-wing opposition groups in the United States fail to support the opposition put up by the Maoists in various regions, especially in light of the fact that the Maoist group have no foundation in metropolitan areas. For instance, the Maoists' use of aggression constitutes such a significant issue that people choose to ignore the political crisis facing the Dantewada-initiated Indian government today and instead focus as opposed on the approaching socioeconomic catastrophe in Dantewada. Segregating the poorest of the poor from the 'violent', intolerant Maoists only allows a significant portion of the left to ignore, even denigrate, the ideological subjective nature of the poorest of the poor, or to make it obedient to the existing constitutional order. The poorest of the poor are only perceived as being in need of assistance, goods, and services. The administration's incapacity to enlist informers from amongst the villagers, say in Lalgarh, is indicative of the Maoists' profound societal roots (see [4]).

It makes sense that in the case of Andhra Pradesh, the state was only able to target and assassinate its political establishment after they compromised themselves by giving territory during peace negotiations. The primary issue facing the state now stems from a radically different interpretation of the Maoist mass base than that put forth by the democracy left. "Their (the Maoists') strong points are not their arsenal of arms, but the support from a large portion of the indigenous population in whose midst and on behalf of whom they operate," notes a former Cabinet officer offering strategies for "dealing with the insurrection." Furthermore, the planners of the Indian state maintain that the Maoists are distinct from the LTTE, which "organized itself like a state and paid a heavy price for it," in contrast to some left-leaning journalists who contend that the Maoist movement and the LTTE are a mirror image of the current oppressive state, a replicative state-in-the-making. By now, the Indian state might have 'drained the water and killed the fish', if, as the progressive left claims, it was so simple as to distinguish the Maoists from the rest of the population.

By ignoring the dynamic, groundbreaking procedure for politics that the current crisis may have sparked, wherein the Indian state and its political system are being forced to shed their constitutional cloak and where the state's constitutional legitimacy has been revealed by the state itself, Dantewada and Lalgarh are being treated as mere hotspots for aggression and counter-violence, wherein some irrational forces are attempting to work themselves out and thus necessitating the involvement of rational, democratic citizens of civil society. Although it is true that the masses in these places are not yet "making history," the battle that they are currently engaged in is about far more than just questions of employment, access to resources, or jal, jangal, jamin (water, forest, land).

Naturally, the goal of the Tatas and Essars is to take resources away from the Adivasis, and the armed onslaught is motivated by large capital. However, this does not imply that the Indigenous peoples' have trouble is limited to defending "their" materials, that they cannot advance past "livelihood issues" and the "struggle for survival," and that they cannot even start a wider political conflict within the nation. truthfully, a sizable portion of the left and progressives' population are incapable of moving past these problems, beyond matters of subsistence. It is not they who are incapable of doing so. Who are we to reach out to while we have our own political battle going on? We are attempting to hide from the trapped innocent people in Dantewada the fact that they are genuinely contacting us and urging us to support their struggle by going beyond their financial issues and jal jangal jamin that we are adamant about providing for them (there is a performance element at play here). Some leftist groups believe that Dantewada and Lalgarh are just waiting to explode in bloodshed and conflict; they do not consider these areas to be potential hotbeds of change that have destroyed Indian democracy and the current political order and suggested a substitute (see [5-6]).

When KPS Gill says that the "ideologues of the Naxalites are convinced they have a different political model to offer," it appears that he is aware of this. Gill is one of the governing class planners. It is obvious that the nation's privileged democratic forces have been thrown under the bus by the most impoverished of the poor, who are calling on them to join an ideological struggle free from ideological ineptitude and naive faith in the potential of the current parliamentary order. Is the nation's democracy left prepared to concede that the most impoverished of the poor may attempt to rewrite the nation's history? And is that too big a job for the 'masses' to take on in a nation where the elites, Nehru-Gandhi-Jinnah-Patel, have historically dictated history through the round table conventions?

This is the point at which the otherwise valid debate over the use of violence appears to be little more than a diatribe in support of the Maoist movement's political stance and its declared challenges to the foundations of contemporary Indian democracy. If not, discussing issues like murder and violence, the value of human life in a complete, the perilous notion of the opponent of the people, and other related topics is perfectly acceptable. In-depth discussion of the death penalty itself is also necessary. This shouldn't be written off as a mere bourgeoisie aberration, as

other Maoist statements have a tendency to be. But it is specifically when these issues become a means of sidestepping the central topic of the democratic fight, and when they are the only yardstick by which the ideology of Maoists is evaluated, that it is deemed 'bourgeois'. Ultimately, these issues cannot be resolved by demands to abstain from aggression or abstract discussions about how violent dehumanizes people; rather, they must be dealt with within the backdrop of the ongoing economic battle (see [7]).

Therefore, it is necessary to intensify the current parliamentary battle in order to confront the issue raised by the Maoists or the upcoming armed state onslaught. The answer is in creating additional Dantewadas, Lalgarhs, and Naxalbaris. While a change in the current political system or the Maoists essentially cannot be ruled out, this does not automatically suggest that there would be more Maoists in their current form. Greater opposition at all levels, middle class as well as working class mobilisation in the cities and towns, feminist and anti-caste movements, and so on, are all necessary for this.

The Nietzschean Abyss

Sujato Bhadro invokes Nietzsche to highlight how violence may draw the Maoist movement into a violent vortex and an oppressive movement, saying that if you stare into the abyss for too long, it will stare back at you ('Open Letter to the Maoists'). In this regard, Bhadra is correct; but why does he believe that the state is the only abyss? Exists another 'abyss' that we may look into that isn't the state and that, in turning back on us, will either shape or define who we are or, at the very least, point us the political path? That is, what if the Maoist movements, Dantewada, or Lalgarh are not only alternatives to the current political system but also everything in and of itself, a mirror image of the state's abyss?

In fact, I am eagerly awaiting the realization of Nietzsche's wish: if Dantewada and the areas under attack are like an abyss, and we are staring at it with all of our eyes fixed upon it, when will the abyss begin to stare back at us, allowing the left to relate to the struggle for independence without the state's 'progressive' decisions acting as a mediator? We are unable to travel there, stare at this chasm, or even visit those places. According to reports, admission and exit into certain places are strictly regulated by security personnel. DGP Vishwa Ranjan of Chattisgarh discusses using "strategic hamletting" to surround the rebels and deny them the peasants' support, akin to "draining the water to kill the fish." No one is permitted to go into those regions. Even fact-finding teams that go there seem to only bring the all-too-common narrative of hapless, imprisoned citizens; they never really address the possibility that these citizens are also representatives of politics dreaming of a different society.

Why is it that we are unable to go meet and interact with the most impoverished people? What is it about them that causes issues even when a Gandhian organization collaborates with them? Is the government being authoritarian or is it only being foolish by preventing communication with the "trapped masses"? However, given that its own interests are directly at risk, it appears that the state has a point and is acting strategically astutely in this instance. It appears that a Gandhian begins to change themselves when he travels to work with the Adivasis in such locations! In fact, certain leaders of peaceful protests have serious issues with those Gandhians in Chattisgarh who are tolerant of Maoist brutality! It is questioned if the Gandhian Himanshu Kumar, who has worked in Chattisgarh for a long time, has softened his stance on Maoist violence. Is it possible for the politically astute poorest of the poor, who support Maoism, to transform the Gandhian into a Communist Gandhian, or even a Gandhian in nature Maoist?

When we claim that we need to get in touch with them, what exactly are we hoping to accomplish? Is it not our intention to shield ourselves from the lessons they may impart? We are afraid, and I wonder how much of the private sector's engagement for helping the stranded citizens comes from us refusing to accept what they have to offer in the first place, and how much of this engagement feeds our subliminal resistance to joining the guerrillas. Either we gaze just at the state, but with harsh accusatory eyes, or we look at the revolting masses and turn them

into untainted imprisoned bystanders. By doing so, we save ourselves from everything there, preserve our current way of life, and stop the uprising, if one exists, in its tracks. We fear that Abyss will turn around and stare straight at us.

The state is against our gazing into that abyss for too long because the abyss will start to stare back at us. As a result, all we can possibly know at this point is that those who reside there are pain and suffering, being confined, and other such things. Regarding the people who are stranded in the country of Colombia, Sri Lanka, and Darfur, we have heard the same thing. Although the abyss will begin to look back at us if we stare into it for too long, the state forbids us from doing so. Therefore, the sole information that we can possibly know about the people who live there at this time is that they are experiencing anguish and pain and suffering, confinement, and other similar things. We have heard the exact same argument about the individuals who are stuck in Darfur, Sri Lanka, and Colombia.

Biting remarks such as "you can hold a gun to a landlord's head but the economic zones or the Indo-US Nuclear power Deal have no head to put a gun to" were used by K. Balagopal to condemn the Maoists for their inability to make a difference in national politics. Of course, maoists have a long way to go and are incapable of doing many things. Though the phrase is accurate in its whole, what if the challenge is to social ties that uphold the current political system and state framework rather than actually rejecting specific state policies like the Deal or SEZ? (Does the CPI (Marxist) oppose the Deal?!) Does Balagopal imply that combating so-called national concerns has nothing to do with changing social connections at the "local" level—he dismisses the importance of the local in comparison to the national? Balgopal argued that Maoists have little interest in "overcoming the state economically but (only) encouraging toward it economically" because he was unable to see the relationship that exists between the head of a landlord in a remote, unremarkable village and the more sophisticated workings of the bourgeoisie democratic systems, or between the gun-wielding without homes laborers and an underground controversial personality.

In contrast to the Nepali the Maoist group' criticism of the Indian the Maoist group, Balagopal did not merely argue that the battle was at a standstill and was unable to strategically advance the uprising by moving from, say, a guerilla zone to a base region. Balagopal never abandoned the divisions he established amongst the local and the national, the military and the political, the impoverished struggling for their rights and the poor as an issue of politics subject, despite his most insightful observations into the inner workings of the Communist organization. His work is exhilaratingly good because he maintained these opposing viewpoints without ever trips and while having a deep understanding of the muscles and nerves of the motions! Once more, we encounter the challenge of isolating subjectivity in politics from the lowest of the poor and their conflicts, which seem to be limited to their local communities and means of subsistence rather than being national or political in nature, regardless of whether these individuals carry guns or not.

Robust Foundations in the Society

The state would prefer to lose some of its constitutionality and accept the guilt for killing those who were innocent, which is initially perceived as "collateral harm" (this time with verbal "aid" from the US military), then to let this infection spread. Since this virus can escalate into a more serious political problem. If there were too many Dantewadas, the current conflict in Dantewada would turn into a dispute over power and serve as a focal point for all of the nation's forces of revolution. One of the main responsibilities of the Indian state is to keep us out of political reality of the conflict and to contain it. The Indian state would prefer to continue this armed campaign and kill anyone who stands in its way than to let the political conflict worsen. It will be a different story altogether if the Communists of China prove to be no electoral threat and quickly transform into a different power organization that compromises and engages in negotiation.

However, if Dantewada truly poses an imminent danger to the current order of power and the Maoists represent the most technologically sophisticated faction in a fierce political conflict, any state would be sensible enough to either proceed with its armed obnoxious or decide against it out of concern for its likelihood of failure. If so, the only way to achieve an upwardly mobile result would be to find a way to use the Dantewada impasse to spark a more serious electoral meltdown for the established order. According to KPS Gill, the Indian state would become enmeshed in a conflict with its own citizens, much to how the US became mired in Afghanistan. Independent media outlets are advocating for reconciliation and dialogue and confronting the military state onslaught by presenting it as a plausible scenario. Gill fails to see that Dantewada could repeat itself wherever and everywhere, whereas the Indian state would become trapped. It is a political battle; the followers of Mao are not the Indian armed forces, nor are the general population only "participants."

In many ways, a rhetorical field is being formed today that aims to isolate politics into something close to a catastrophe for humanity while simultaneously defining an ideological field that prevents the creation of a higher political battle. In the event that the militaristic government decides to take on the Maoists in the same way as the LTTE, the humanitarian narrative has previously, if unspoken, predicted that an international disaster such to the one in Jaffna may arise here. Not only is it predicted that a radical sociopolitical scenario may arise in this instance, but the aid organizations also appear committed to preventing its emergence in the first place by failing to foresee it. Similar to a fictitious founding moment, the term "armed offensive" itself prompts this interpretation of the Dantewada crisis as essentially military, eliminating any political component and painting the Maoists as little more than an armed faction. This story of an armed war between parties with bystanders as casualties is further fueled by attempts to isolate the Maoists from the general public and common people. The concept that innocent civilians are merely "suffering beings" who are yearning for peace and an uninterrupted supply of everything they need is reinforced by the discussion of rights surrounding them.

Depictions of "constitutional is struggling" as political and violent confrontations as militaristic in nature "unconstitutional," and even less than political are among the ways the Adivasi Maoist's emergence as an issue of political importance is hindered. These depictions completely miss the mark on how political disputes can and do take on violent forms. As a result, providing for the population's basic requirements need not be the only "ideological response" to this situation. Such a conception of a "political solution" hides the fact that the the most impoverished of the poor are, maybe even in their own personal perception, politically prepared to engage in a political dispute and even to emerge as the nation's most developed disengagement from groundbreaking change. The lowest of the poor taking up arms to fight an ideological battle against the amalgamated and long-hidden fist of the wealthy and state is not militarism; rather, it leads to a decisive clash that advances an ideological matter to its eventual settlement rather than pushing it aside. Are large swaths of the left prepared to follow this course?

One method used to keep Maoists from being seen as an opposition group is to forbid the look, leaving us in the dark about their thoughts. What do the Maoists think of this state attack using armed force? First of all, they do not consider the state's impending endeavor to be a misadventure that would further weaken the foundation of democracy in the state. Rather, the CPI (Maoist) contends that this is "the premeditated State Bombardment on populist movements throughout history and in particularly on the communist masses, CPI (Maoist) Party and its armed component". The Maoists comprehend the onslaught economically and do not see it only from a military perspective. While mass opposition to the onslaught is maintained, the socialist political campaign is not abandoned. They jot down, "While the PLGA forces are preparing to heroically resist the enemy, the Party and its mass organizations must seek to mobilize all possible forces to resist and fight back this impending attack. The aim of the enemy is to isolate us from the masses to facilitate the attacks, with the least protest by the progressive and democratic forces in the country. Our aim must be to prevent this enemy encirclement by building deep roots in the masses".

Establishing strong roots in the community is thought to be a component of the same procedure as fortifying and priming the PLGA. The state's "exhausting the water to kill the fish" tactic stems from this. According to Maoist comments, they do not see the armed attack as only an aggression and are aware that isolating themselves from the public will only aid in their eradication by the state. They also appear eager to connect with a larger range of broad coalitions and opposition.

Still, large swaths of the left appear unaware of the opportunities to become fully integrated into the political struggle that the Communist Party of China has released. Their attention is relentlessly focused on the state, with an emphasis on revealing its aggressive plans, but they do not attempt to organize the overwhelming majority of the populace to support the progressive independence, or the Dantewada revolutionaries' multitudes. Therefore, when the republican left looks at the state, it either sees victims who are defenseless and waiting for middle class activists to step in, or it looks at its revolutionary masses. The current direction of peacemaking efforts obstructs the emergence of revolutionary circumstances in the nation and the political struggle's intensification by organizing various national resistance groups in solidarity with Dantewada's opposition.

Poor Home Minister?

Is it not the case that we are hammering the Home Minister excessively for his focus on a military solution to the Maoist issue? Is there anything crucial that we are overlooking, a sort of hidden message that we should decipher for the benefit of everyone, not just the minister and the greater Indian state? What if the minister of defense is genuinely acknowledging that Indian democracy and its political system have reached their limits and are on the verge of collapse, meaning that a military response is appropriate because there is now no political card in the deck that can be used to match the challenge of preventing the Maoist movement? The critics of the minister who prioritized security over advancement may still maintain faith in Indian democracy and its ability to fend off the Maoists, but he and those in the system are well aware of the value of 'our democratic government' and the economic and social the strategy.

It appears that the Maoist approach of communist armed struggle, which appeals to large numbers of people more than, for example, the approach to decentralization, the empowering of gram sabhas, or social policies like NREGA, is superior to even 'our' best democratic measures. Today's social movements that have no Naxal or Maoist ancestry show signs of extreme fatigue, if not outright failure. Maoists teach the masses that it is OK to rebel, that Indian independence is a form of blackmail, that true independence is still to come, that Gandhi was a reactionary, and that, to paraphrase Mao, "the people are nothing absent a community's army." What 'constitutional reaction' is there to this that may be achieved through social movements or by staying within the bounds of the Indian Constitution? The Home Minister is facing a serious issue. For the lowest of the poor, it appears that there is only one option: join the people's army, receive 100 days of work, or participate in the Roza Yojana, which grants job rights or woodland rights.

The Maoists are providing a holiday for the populace, while the Indian state can only provide two full meals per day at most. Remember the Maoist-led mass armed protest in Lalgarh on June 15, 2009? We watched images of common villagers and women publicly applauding as the CPIM leader's house was being forcibly destroyed. After the joint protection forces' "flushing out" functioning, didn't the West Bengal administration do all within its power to reach out to the tribal population with bargains and welfare packages? Did that cause the Maoists' support to decline? All secretary were forced, albeit reluctantly, to camp in the desolate city of Lalgarh by Buddhadev Bhattacharya in order to genuinely learn about the challenges facing the populace. However, it failed to sway the general population from the Maoist militants.

As a result, the Indian democracy as it exists now has reached its limit and is in danger from the Maoists. The current conflict need not only result in acts of violence and retaliation as well as the

collapse of the middle ground. In terms of politics, the state is at its weakest because it is losing its parliamentary accoutrements and is showing itself to be nothing more than a suppressive deadweight because preventing any meaningful democratic progress. Thus, there is a genuine chance for a profound revolution in society and politics to occur now. Put another way, there may genuinely be a chance now to start a radical process of transformation and change and toss the faltering Indian democratic and state order—including our lovely secular democracy—into the trash heap of history. In which case, naturally, one is speaking about a "moving" Maoist organization and a "moving" middle ground that eventually combine to completely isolate the state's military, protection, and growth-oriented sectors. Is it not time for the real left to intervene, not to rescue the collapsing system but to force its breakdown and the development of a better social and economic issues regime, given that the impoverished home minister is going so far as to acknowledge that the Indian political system is irredeemable and that it can only respond with an armed forces solution? A "higher" middle ground will inevitably require us to break free from the oppressive state's hold on democracies and support a new political future that opposes this system of governance.

Not just independence from politics, but also a social and economic revolution was once the vision of Bhagat Singh and his allies. It's an incomplete task. Although the Maoists are undoubtedly the change-bearers, are they a strong enough political force to bring about a radical overhaul of the Indian state and society? It is not impossible for the Communist Party of China to evolve from what appears to be a purely local political position struggle to one that articulates the nation's current geopolitical search for a viable challenge to the current macroeconomic order and state structure.

The democracy and dissident left, which includes the fervent rights campaigners, will be vital in this regard. The potential of the current state-Maoist struggle ending in only violence will persist unless a democratic right a different light calling for an end to the military option is in many apparent and unnoticed ways woven around its readiness to look for an electoral replacement to the current Indian state order, including its sham democratic processes. There is no doubt about the decision: military or political? That is, we are living at a time of enormous opportunities as well as grave risks, as stated in a Maoist manifesto.

Beyond Maoist?

You hide the potential of a larger development of revolutionary democratic principles by moving towards the state and become first and foremost, perhaps even exclusively, involved in uncovering the state (on its own grounds). The Maoists, who are the most impoverished of the poor, are actually urging all forward-thinking democratic organizations to band together to defeat the ruling party's offensive. This is completely hidden from view, and serves as an excellent example of how you only hear what you want to hear. They are the ones who have attempted to reach out to you, even as you attempt to ignore it with your compassionate worries regarding them. Otherwise, Ganapathy's outspoken appeal for unity is just discursive: "By building the broadest fighting front, and by adopting appropriate tactics of combining the militant mass political movement with armed resistance of the people and our PLGA (People's Liberation Guerilla Army), we will defeat the massive offensive by the Central-state forces".

Of course, the key question here is whether other leftist and liberal groups would recognize the PLGA and militant opposition as being legitimate political actors. The armed forces and the PLGA, however, provide a significant obstacle and overwhelming resistance anywhere they appear for the Indian state and capital today, not to mention its oppressive armed wing. The idea that the Adivasis, led by the Maoists, have sparked a dispute over politics in which the state and capital are compelled to reveal their true, unholy nature while disdaining the rule of law and their pretended democracy characteristics does not sound absurd at all.

With the abundance of natural resources and massive mine deposits around the region, many activists and pundits have highlighted how the desires of the wealthy are really driving the state's

activities. In today's political fight, the integration between business and state is evident. The state and capitalism are compelled to renounce every semblance of democratic systems, the rule of law, and commerce as usual as a result of the Maoist movement's accomplishment and years of labor in this area. Today, the repressive, opportunistic nature of the state and business is borne.

The idea is that the state and capital are inherently repressive, and this is especially true for the great masses of people. People who understand the nature of the ruling order and are prepared to resist it despite resorting to the order's democracy pretenses are found in locations like Dantewada and Lalgarh. This renders both the local populace and the Maoists a sophisticated faction, especially in light of the recent intense political conflict that has resulted in a crisis of national significance. These are the reasons why the PLGA, mired in a dispute over politics, should be disregarded as nothing more than a violent system or a mere clone of the state.

Furthermore, the Indian state is currently weakest in this area. Here, the Indian state and its electoral system have been widely repudiated by the populace, driving it to employ military tactics against its own civilian citizens. It now resembles a mafia state that is despised by all and must therefore rely on persecution and force to exist. This implies that in the current political class battle, we should not only hurry to defend Dantewada or Lalgarh, but also establish comparable, if not identical, bases across the nation. Should it not be abandoned, our humanistic "concern" (which inexplicably easily becomes condescending) for the "trapped masses" ought to be tactically employed to progressively encircle the government, with the ultimate goal of turning the Dantewada experiment into an occurrence spanning the entire country.

The Maoists one, however, have not been clever in broadening the scope of their struggle, connecting with the urban masses, and getting over their frequently sectarian views and antiquated labor practices and ways of thinking. They don't appear to know how to connect with other political organizations to expand the fight in metropolitan areas, counter the more cunning schemes of "democratic" systems, and so forth. Less formally, one could say that a combination of the 'dogmatism' of the Indian Maoists and the 'flexibility' of the Nepali Maoists would be ideal for revolution in South Asia. On the other hand, as we have seen in Lalgarh and other places, the Maoists are open to change—if not always voluntarily. And they have to adapt. What matters most, though, is the broader communist process, of which the Maoists are merely the more advanced components and that too, for the time being in the current context, neither arbitrators nor even master's degrees.

Conclusion

India, the world's largest democracy, has a relatively recent experience with democratic governance. Since independence, its political landscape has undergone several significant changes, including periods of one-party rule, multi-party coalitions during the Emergency, and constitutional challenges. Various political parties and socio-political movements have emerged and disappeared over time.

This study offers a broad overview of India's political history, from the dominance of the Congress Party after independence, through Indira Gandhi's Emergency period, to the rise of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in 2014 and 2019. Recent political events, such as the Citizenship Amendment Act, protests against farm laws, and debates over the constitution's preamble and guaranteed rights, have generated widespread discussion.

In this research note, we also examine the current political conflicts in both India and Nepal, analyzing the ongoing struggles and their implications for democracy and governance in both countries.

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